The Estate of Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson v. Maria Jackson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
The Estate of Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson v.
Maria Jackson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael K. Black; Young, Kester & Petro; Attorneys for Appellant.
Gary H. Weight; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jackson v. Jackson, No. 2000486 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2526
$&.-« topi m 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAHKOURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTAIE OF 
LYNN FRANKLIN AVERETT J^KKSON 
Decedent, 
MARIA JACKSON, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 2000486-CA 
(Priority 15) 
APPEHANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from F( 
of Utah 
The Honorable Jame 
rth Judicial District Court 
flinty, State of Utah 
fflR. Taylor, District Court Judge 
MICHAEL K. BLACK, (#5038) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Appellant 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 2 2 200! 
Pautette Stagg 
CJerfs of the (kmn 
GARY H. WEIGHT, (#3415) 
Attorney for Appellee 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ; 
LYNN FRANKLIN AVERETT JACKSON ; 
Decedent, ] 
MARIA JACKSON, ; 
Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 2000486-CA 
) (Priority 15) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable James R. Taylor, District Court Judge 
MICHAEL K. BLACK, (#5038) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Appellant 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
GARY H. WEIGHT, (#3415) 
Attorney for Appellee 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
1. Maria Jackson, Appellant 
2. Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas, Appellees 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 4 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 4 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 13 
POINT ONE - The District Court erred in holding that it was not 
necessary for there to be a physical delivery of the 
deed in order to complete the transfer of real 
property 13 
POINT TWO - The Trial Court erred in determining that the mere 
signing of the Deed and giving copies of the Deed to 
his daughters constitute a valid delivery 19 
POINT THREE - Marshaling of evidence in support of the Court's 
3 
position and in regard to the granting of a key to the 
safety deposit box to Linda Thomas 22 
CONCLUSION 27 
APPENDICES 
A. Deed 
B. Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson 
C. Transcript of Court's Oral Ruling 
D. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985) 17 
Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998) 5 
Singleton v. Kelly, 212 P. 63 (Utah 1922) 16 
Wiggill v. Cheney. 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979) 16 
23 AmJur.2d 120, 156 22 
23 AmJur.2d Deeds 121, 157 22 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(J), Utah Code Annotated. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in holding that it was not necessary for 
there to be a physical delivery of the deed in order to complete the transfer of 
real property. 
2. Did the Trial Court err in determining that the mere signing of the 
Deed and giving copies of the Deed to his daughters constitute a valid delivery. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Inasmuch as the factual issues in this case are not in dispute, the 
Appellate Court reviews the legal issues for correctness. Meadowbrook, LLC 
v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF 
THE APPEAL 
There are no statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose 
interpretations are determinative of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Linda Thomas, the daughter of the deceased Lynn Franklin Averett 
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Jackson, filed an application for informal appointment of personal 
representative on September 9, 1999 and pursuant to the nomination in the Will 
was appointed the personal representative of the Estate. Linda Thomas and 
Connie Rowan maintain the position that the Deed signed in August of 1997 
conveyed the home of Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson into three equal shares 
with one-third to Linda Thomas, one-third to Connie Rowan and one-third to 
the Estate of Lynn F. Jackson. Maria Jackson, the wife of Lynn Franklin 
Averett Jackson, maintains the position that because the Deed was never 
delivered, that the home remains the property of the Estate of Lynn Jackson 
and should be conveyed pursuant to a Codicil to Lynn Jackson's Will granting 
the property to Ms. Jackson. The parties agreed to set the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing and prepared a Pre-Trial Order and the matter was heard in 
the probate case before Judge James R. Taylor. At the conclusion of the Trial 
on April 6, 2000, the Honorable James R. Taylor ruled against the 
Respondent/Appellant Maria Jackson on the basis that the signing of the Deed 
and giving copies to Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan completed the transfer 
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of the property. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered the 4th day of May, 2000. Maria Jackson/Appellant filed an appeal on 
June 5, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The original deed in question was offered at trial as Plaintiffs 
exhibit 1. (See a copy attached as Appendix A). 
2. In August 1997, Lynn F. Jackson (hereinafter the "Decedent"), 
met with his attorney Richard Coxson along with the Decedent's two daughters 
Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan in Mr. Coxson's law office in Spanish Fork 
Utah. (R 59 page 8 line 14-19) 
3. Prior to the drafting of the deed Mr. Coxson and the Decedent 
discussed the differences between a deed with rights of survivorship and a deed 
which granted joint tenancy. (R 59 page 31 Lines 3-21) 
4. Mr. Coxson then prepared the deed according to the instructions 
given by the Decedent. (R 59 page 29 lines 13- 15). 
5. The deed was not signed in Mr. Coxson's office but rather the 
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Decedent, Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas went to First Security Bank 
(which was within one block of the law office) wherein the Decedent signed 
the Deed and had it notarized on August 19, 1997. (R 59 page 9 lines 19- page 
10 line 2) 
6. There was no conversation between the Notary and the deceased 
or Linda Thomas or Connie Rowan at the time of the signing of the Deed at 
First Security Bank. (R 59 page 12 lines 18-20) 
7. After leaving the bank with the signed Deed, the Decedent 
physically carried the deed. (R 59 page 12 line 25- page 13 line 1) 
8. The Decedent, Linda Thomas, and Connie Rowan then returned to 
the Law Office of Richard Coxson and the attorney gave Linda Thomas and 
Connie Rowan a copy of the Deed and gave the original back to the Decedent. 
(R 59 page 13 lines 4-6 and T page 20 lines 19-22). 
9. Attorney Richard Coxson informed the Decedent that it was the 
procedure in his office that he would record the Deeds that he prepared (R 59 
page 32 lines 25-page 33 line 5) and that until the deed was recorded there was 
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not a completed transfer of the property to his children. (R 59 page 39 lines 5-
16) 
10. The Decedent declined to allow Mr. Coxson to record the deed 
and left the attorney's office with the deed in his (Decedent's) possession. (R 
59 page 33 lines 6-10) 
11. With regard to the recording of the Deed, Mr. Coxson testified as 
follows: 
Q. Are you aware of any circumstances with regard to 
your involvement with this Estate where Lynn Jackson ever 
relinquished his control of the Deed? 
A. No, I explained to him when we were talking 
about the Deed that if it were not recorded then it would not be 
a complete transfer of the property to his children, that it had to 
be recorded, and I told him that normally we do that and we 
discussed that. 
Q. So you believe it was clear in Lynn's mind that 
unless it was recorded that that was not a completed 
transaction. 
A. 1 explained it and he seemed to understand and 
that is why he wanted to keep the Deed rather than record it. 
(R 59 page 39 lines 5-16) 
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12. Pursuant to a Pre-Trial Order wherein the parties stipulated to certain 
facts the parties stipulated that the deed was never recorded. (R page 39 paragraph 
7). 
13. The Decedent, Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas then left the 
attorney's office. Connie Rowan and her father (the Decedent) then dropped off 
Linda Thomas at Ms. Thomas' home and then went to Cental Bank in Springville, 
Utah where her father (the Decedent) put the Deed in his safety deposit box. (R 
59 page 20 lines 23-page 21 line 3) 
14. At the time the Decedent placed the Deed into his safety deposit box, 
neither Connie Rowan or Linda Thomas had a key to the safety deposit box. (R 
59 page 21 lines 4-5, T Page 14 lines 5-9) 
15. From the date that the Decedent placed the Deed in his safety deposit 
box until his death, he retained ownership and access to the safety deposit box. (R 
59 page 22 lines 22-page 23 line 1) 
16. At no time after the Decedent placed the Deed in the safety deposit 
box did Connie Rowan or Linda Thomas ever access the safety deposit box, until 
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after Mr. Jackson's passing. (R 59 page 23 lines 18-page 24 line 3 see also T page 
25 lines 1-13) 
17. Pursuant to a pre-trial order wherein the parties stipulated to certain 
facts the parties stipulated that at the time of the Decedent's death, the original 
Deed was contained in the safety deposit box of the Decedent. (R page 39 
paragraph 8). 
18. Neither Linda Thomas nor Connie Rowan offered any testimony at 
trial regarding any instructions from the Decedent to remove the deed from the 
safety deposit box nor was any testimony offered that the Decedent ever 
relinquished physical control of the deed. (See Transcript) 
19. On the 27th day of January 1998, the Decedent executed a 
testamentary document entitled "Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson." (R page 39 
paragraph 12) 
20. The "Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson" dated January 27, 1998 is the 
last testamentary document known to any of the parties. (R page 39 paragraph 13) 
21. The "Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson," reads: 
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Lynn Jackson, being of sound mind and discerning 
judgment hereby adds a codicil to my will making 
changes thereto. These changes are to replace the 
interest of Betty Willis in the estate and reduce it to 0 
based upon my own reasons, she and her Decedents not 
to share equally with the remaining beneficiaries. Linda 
Thomas will receive $500.00 from the house and 
$500.00 from US Steel. The $500.00 to be paid after the 
sale of my home. Connie Rowan will receive $1,000.00 
after the sale of the home. My wife will receive the 
balance of my estate. (R page 5) 
Attorney Mr. Coxson testified as follows: 
Q. When he put into the Codicil, MMy wife will 
receive the balance of my estate," do you believe that 
included the home? 
A. That was his intent. 
Q. Did he give any reasons why he was 
changing the interest he was giving to his daughters. 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court the reasons 
for that. 
A. He kept saying what a terrific wife Maria 
was and how happy he was with her, and he wanted to 
take care of her, and he discussed that a little bit and we 
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had a discussion in private without Maria because I 
wanted to make sure that I understood what he wanted 
without there being unnecessary pressure there from his 
wife. 
Q. Were your private conversations with him 
consistent with the testimony you have given? 
A. Yes they are. (R 59 page 36 line 24 to page 
37 line 15) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Lynn Franklin Jackson failed to deliver the deed even though the Court 
found that he had a present intent to convey the property and consequently a valid 
conveyance did not occur. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS NOT 
NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE A PHYSICAL DELIVERY OF THE 
DEED IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY. 
The facts in this case are not materially in dispute. The dispute arises 
regarding the issue of law whether the physical delivery of the Deed was 
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necessary. All of the facts which are set out in the Statement of Facts come from 
the testimonies of Linda Thomas, Connie Rowan, and Attorney Richard Coxon 
which establish that from the point in time, the Decedent Lynn F. Jackson lifted 
the pen from the signing of the Deed, all facts thereafter lead to the conclusion that 
the Decedent had no intention of delivering the Deed as required by law. The 
Decedent physically carried the Deed from First Security Bank back to Mr. 
Coxson's law office. He allowed Mr. Coxson to make copies and give copies to 
his daughters Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas but then retained the original 
Deed in his possession. When invited by his attorney to allow the attorney to 
record the Deed, Mr. Jackson declined. When instructed by Mr. Coxson that the 
Deed must be recorded in order to complete the transaction, again Mr. Jackson 
declined to record the Deed. Even though the advice may not have been accurate 
from his attorney, it demonstrates Mr. Jackson's unwillingness to part with 
possession of the Deed. From Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas own testimony, 
they then left the law office, they dropped Linda Thomas off at her home and then 
Mr. Jackson and Connie Rowan traveled to Central Bank in Springville, Utah, 
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where Mr. Jackson placed the Deed in his safety deposit box for safe keeping. 
Neither Connie Rowan nor Linda Thomas had keys or access to the safety deposit 
box when the Deed was placed in it. Neither Connie Rowan or Linda Thomas 
ever again went to the safety deposit box nor saw the Deed again until after the 
death of Mr. Jackson. The Deed was in the safety deposit box at the time of Mr. 
Jackson's death and was not retrieved until after his passing. Mr. Jackson further 
took actions during his life time that would lead one to the conclusion that he had 
no intent to deliver the Deed, when in January of 1998, some five months after 
signing the Deed, he went to his attorney, Mr. Richard Coxson and had Mr. 
Coxson draft a Codicil to the Will of Lynn Jackson which left the home to Maria 
Jackson his wife, with the exception of nominal amounts being paid to Linda 
Thomas and Connie Rowan. 
When Mr. Jackson went to attorney Richard Coxson in January of 1998 to 
prepare the Codicil to his Will, Mr. Jackson believed that he still retained 
complete ownership of the home. (R 59 page 36, lines 21- page 37, line 2) The 
Deed was signed the 19th of August, 1997, some five months prior to the 
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preparation of the Codicil to his Will. 
The Utah Case Law requires a present intent to convey plus a physical 
delivery or parting with possession of the Deed in order to complete the transfer. 
In all of the cases cited below, the mere signing of the Deed was insufficient to 
complete the transfer of the property. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Singleton v. Kelly. 212 P. 63 (Utah 1922) 
states: 
Counsel for Appellate say that it is a cardinal rule that the Courts will carry 
out the grantors intention wherever this is possible. This is true, but without 
any evidence of delivery it can be of no importance whatsoever what the 
intentions of the grantor in this case were. One may have an intention to 
convey his property to another, but unless the Deed is delivered to the 
grantee or someone for him, title cannot pass, and the undelivered Deed is a 
nullity. Id. at 66. 
The Utah Supreme Court again addressed the issue of delivery of a Deed in 
Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979). In Wiggill. Lillian Cheney signed 
a Deed granting ownership in a certain parcel of property to Flora Cheney as 
grantee. Lillian Cheney then placed the Deed in her safety deposit box which 
allowed access to both Lillian Cheney and Frances E. Wiggill. Following the 
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placement of the Deed in her safety deposit box, Lillian Cheney advised Wiggill 
that upon her death, he was to go to the bank where he would be granted access to 
the safety deposit box and was instructed to give the Deed to Lillian Cheney. The 
sole question before the Supreme Court was whether based upon the above stated 
facts a valid delivery of the Deed was accomplished. The Supreme Court 
determined that a valid delivery did not occur and stated as follows: 
The Rule is well settled that a Deed, to be operative as a transfer of 
ownership of land, or an interest, or estate therein, must be delivered. It was 
equally settled in this and the vast majority of jurisdictions that a valid 
delivery of a Deed requires it past bevond the control or domain of the 
grantor.... 
However, in order for delivery effectively to transfer Title, the grantor 
must part with possession of the Deed or the right to retain it. ]d. at 1352. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court in determining that there was not a valid transfer of the 
property determined that because the grantor maintained ownership and access to 
the safety deposit box that a valid delivery did not occur. 
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of delivery of a Deed in 
relationship to retaining control of a safety deposit box in Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
'P.2d 757 (Utah 1985). In the Bennion case, the factual background is as follows: 
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In 1972, Grover A. Hansen, a grandfather, signed an Irrevokable 
Declaration of Trust granting certain property to his grandsons upon the death of 
their mother, i.e. the daughter of Grover Hansen. A Deed was prepared conveying 
the property into the Trust. The Deed was signed but not recorded. In 1974, the 
grandfather Grover Hansen established an amendment to the Trust altering the 
terms of the 1972 Trust. The Court outlined the following as part of the factual 
basis: 
First, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Grover Hansen 
had put the Deed in the safety deposit box. Second, even if he did put the 
Deed in the box, there was evidence that he did not do so with the intention 
to relinquish control over it and to effect delivery into the Trust. The 
evidence was undisputed that Grover maintained control over the Deed 
from 1972 until 1974. No one saw either the Trust Declaration or the Deed 
from 1972 until Grover produced the documents in 1974 when the 
Amendments were executed and all documents were recorded. Id. at 759. 
The Supreme Court concluded that since there was not a delivery of the 
Deed in 1972 because Grover Hansen maintained control and possession of the 
Deed but there had been no effective delivery until the Amendments to the Trust 
and Deed were recorded in 1974. 
The intent of the grantor in the case at hand is clear that after the execution 
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of the Deed he was unwilling to part with the possession of the Deed, allow his 
attorney to record the Deed and further went to the effort of preparing a Codicil to 
his Will which contradicts any intent in the Deed to convey the property to Linda 
Thomas and Connie Rowan. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE MERE SIGNING 
OF THE DEED AND GIVING COPIES OF THE DEED 
TO HIS DAUGHTERS CONSTITUTE A VALID DELIVERY. 
The Court at the beginning of the Trial was quite clear on the issue 
presented and stated as follows: 
Q. Well (inaudible) fundamental issue. I mean a Warranty Deed 
was executed by the grantor but not delivered until after his death. The 
issue is whether it is effective to convey title, isn't it? 
A. Well, we don't agree (inaudible). 
Q. That is the issue. 
A. That is the issue." 
(R 59 page 6, line 1-7) 
The Court, however, later as the attorneys were making their closing 
arguments redefined his perception of the issue in the case and stated as follows: 
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Well, what is at issue is not handing over the paper, what is at issue is 
the fact that the paper and whatever goes on expresses an intent to transfer 
the property. Isn't that - that is what matters. (R 59 page 71 lines 14-17) 
The Court as part of its opinion indicates that there need not be a physical 
delivery of the Deed when it concludes as follows: 
As to the burden of proof, the burden of proof is on Mr. Weight, but 
because this is not a recorded Deed, I am going to conclude as a matter of 
law - - and I may be wrong on this, maybe some court will tell me and then 
we will have some law on it, but my conclusion is that because it is not a 
recorded Deed, the burden of proof is a preponderance. I find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jackson intended to transfer his 
property into one-third interest and that he did - - and by executing the Deed 
in the presence of his daughters, the grantees, and causing copies to be 
delivered to them together with giving them access to the safety deposit box 
where he specifically showed them the Deed would be kept, that he 
accomplished delivery. (R 59 page 80 line 16-page 81 line 3) 
The facts of this case cause one to ask: at what point in time along the 
chronology of facts (if ever) does the Court determine that the transfer was 
complete. It appears that the District Court made the determination of transfer at 
the close of three events: 1) executing the deed, 2) causing copies of the deed to be 
given to the daughters and finally 3) giving them access to the safety deposit box. 
The only facts for which the parties disagree related to how Linda Thomas 
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obtained a key to the safety deposit box which will be addressed in the final point. 
How or when Linda Thomas obtained a key is not material in any event. Linda 
testified that some time after the deed was placed in the safety deposit box her 
father gave her a key. There was no testimony offered, even assuming the facts as 
offered by Linda Thomas, to the effect that her father instructed her to have the 
deed recorded nor did her father at any time relinquish his control or access to the 
safety deposit box. In fact, Linda testified that her father gave no explanation or 
instruction at the time she testified she received the key. (See Point 3 below) The 
action of the parties lead to the conclusion that even if a key was given it was not 
with any intent to cause delivery. No instructions were given at the time to 
remove the deed. Linda never attempted to access the box until after the death of 
Lynn Jackson and most importantly the only directive given to anyone regarding 
the deed after its placement in the safety deposit were the written instructions 
given in his Codicil to his Will giving the property to his wife. 
There are a number of citations in AmJur which further enlighted the 
foregoing facts: 
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... In other words, the delivery of a Deed in the law of conveyancing is a 
transfer of it from the grantor to the grantee or his agent or some third party 
for the grantees use, in such manner as to deprive the grantor of the right to 
recall it at his option and with intent to convey title. 23 AmJur.2d 120, 156. 
(Emphasis added.) 
...a deed, to be operative as a transfer of the ownership of land or an interest 
or estate therein, must be delivered; it is delivery that gives the instrument 
force and effect. Delivery is essential regardless of what the consideration 
for the Deed was. It is as necessary as the signature of the grantor and 
without it all other formalities are ineffectual. Hence, delivery has been 
called "the life of a deed." An undelivered Deed does not divest the grantor 
of, or invest the grantee with Title, even though the intent to deliver is clear 
and the failure to deliver due to accident.... 23 AmJur.2d Deeds 121, 157. 
The facts, even relying only on the testimony of Linda Thomas and Connie 
Rowan only, lead to the conclusion that Lynn Jackson never placed the deed 
outside of his possession or right to recall it. 
POINT 3 
MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
COURT'S POSITION AND IN REGARD TO THE 
GRANTING OF A KEY TO THE SAFETY DEPOSIT 
BOX TO LINDA THOMAS. 
The items contained in the Statement of Facts contain the testimony of 
Linda Thomas, Connie Rowan, and Attorney Richard Coxson, court documents 
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and facts which were stipulated to prior to trial by the parties. As stated 
previously, the facts of the case are not disputed with the exception of the means 
by which Linda Thomas obtained a key to the safety deposit box. 
Linda Thomas at trial testified as follows: 
Q: I asked you previously when you were testifying if you had a 
key to the deposit box. 
A. I do. 
Q. Who gave it to you? 
A. My father. 
Q. When he gave that to you, did he make any statement to you 
about what it was or why he was giving it to you? 
A. He showed me where he keeps the keys and he just said, T lose 
a lot of keys, so here's a copy.' 
Q. Did he tell you what the key was to? 
A. Yes, the safety deposit box. 
Q. Did he make any reference to your ability to get into that safety 
deposit box? 
A. He did not really say anything about that. 
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Q. Did you discuss the contents of the box or his intention with 
his respect to them when he handed the key to you? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you been back to the safety deposit box between the time 
of the execution of the Deed and today? 
A. I have not. (R59 page 24 line 19 - page 25 line 13) 
On our cross-examination: 
Q. Did he physically hand you a key on that day or did he give 
you - or did you obtain a key later? 
A. He just said, "Here's the key," and I just took one. 
Q. Can you tell me - - can you identify when that occurred? Can 
you give me an idea of season or year? 
A. I cannot. I cannot recall. 
Q. Was it prior to his death? 
A. Yes. (R59 page 26 line 24 - 27 line 6) 
On redirect examination, Linda testified as follows: 
Q. You previously testified on direct the first time you were 
testifying that you received a key to your father's safety deposit box about a 
month to a month and one-half after he opened it? 
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A. I can't really say for sure how long it was, I just can't 
remember. 
Q. So now you don't remember, you don't - -
A. It could have been longer than a month, a couple of months, 
maybe I'm not sure about the date. 
Q. Do you think it was longer than one year? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you think it was within two months? 
A. I really can't say. (R59 page 27 line 17 - page 28 line 4) 
The controverting evidence was presented by David Crosby who was the 
son of Appellant Maria Jackson. David Crosby testified that prior to the death of 
Lynn Jackson, Lynn indicated to him that there were two sets of keys to the safety 
deposit box. (R59 page 47 lines 14-19) 
Mr. Jackson identified to David Crosby that one set of key had been given 
to his mother and that the other set of keys was located in a metal box which was 
kept in the bedroom of Lynn Jackson and the Appellant Maria Jackson. (R59 page 
47 lines 14-23) 
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Lynn Jackson explained that upon his death it was important for him and his 
mother to access the safety deposit box in that the safety deposit box contained 
documentation by Lynn wherein he was giving everything to his wife Maria 
Jackson. (R59 page 48 line 17-page 47 line 1) 
After the death of Lynn Jackson, the metal box containing the keys to the 
safety deposit box disappeared from the home. (R59 page 1-3) 
On the night prior to the funeral of Lynn Jackson, David Crosby overheard 
a conversation between Connie Rowan and Linda Thomas wherein they were 
talking about the safety deposit box wherein Connie Rowan indicated that she had 
been able to retrieve a key to the safety deposit box and the next day they would 
go to the bank to open the safety deposit box. (R59 page 50 lines 1-14) 
With the use of the keys given to Maria Jackson by her husband prior to his 
death, Maria Jackson and David Crosby went the next morning and retrieved the 
documents from the safety deposit box which included the Deed at issue in this 
case. (R59 page 50 lines 21-page 51 line 20) 
As set out above, the timing of when or how Linda Thomas obtained a key 
to the safety deposit box does not materially change the issues regarding delivery 
inasmuch as Lynn Jackson maintained complete control and access to the box and 
for the reasons set out above. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as the facts are not materially in dispute, the Court can determine 
the merits of this case based upon the application of the law to the facts as set out. 
The legal authorities set out above indicate that the mere signing of a deed does 
not complete a transfer of property without the physical delivery of the deed. The 
facts are abundant and undisputed that Lynn Jackson maintained control of the 
deed until his death and the deed was contained in his safety deposit box after his 
death. 
The failure of delivery of the deed precludes an inter-vivos transfer of the 
property and consequently, the Court should determine that the property passes 
according to Lynn Jackson's testamentary desires as set out in the Codicil to the 
Will. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the 
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District Court to determine that delivery did not occur and grant judgment in favor 
of Appellant. 
DATED this 18th day of Januafv, 2001, 
'&4 L %L 
MICHAEL K. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ( P day of January, 2001,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Gary H. Weight, Esq. 
43 East 200 North 
BoxL 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 MUJLM^. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEED 
WARRANTY DEED 
LYNN F. JACKSON, GRANTOR, of SPRINGVILLE City, County of Utah, 
State of Utah, hereby GRANTS the ESTATE to LYNN F. JACKSON, LINDA 
THOMAS AND CONNIE ROWAN, GRANTEES, of Utah County, State of Utah, 
for the sum of Ten and no/100 ($10.00) Dollars, and other good and 
valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in 
Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains 
North from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of 
Section 4, Township 8 South, Range 3 East of 
the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
63 feet; thence East 100 feet; thence South 63 
feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Together with all water rights 
appertaining thereto. 
Witness the hand of said GRANTOR, th 
CLu^Q M&t , 1997 
ls H day of 
W} LYpf F. JACKS Grantor 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SS 
On the V\\Wdav of ^\^< Q-v^^r- ., 1997, personally 
appeared before me LYNN F. JACKSON, the signer of the within 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same, 
PLAINTIFFS 
BtTNO. f-
^ ^ CAROLYN I . KARTELL 
— ^ & mm ntuc. STATE »t urn 
fc\$ FIRST SECURITY BAHX 
\'A fll«S!ffl W 8S2 NORTH 100 EAST 
'"' SMMSHFORK, UTAH 84860 
COMM. EXP. 2-15-00 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
APPENDIX B 
CODICIL TO WILL OF LYNN JACKSON 
CODICIL TO WILL OF 
LYNN JACKSON 
Lynn Jackson, being of sound mind and discerning judgment, 
hereby adds a Codicil to my will making changes thereto. These 
changes are to replace the interest of Betty Willis^in the estate 
and reduce it t£^$GIRftBfbased upon my own reasons, she and her 
descendants not To share equally with the remaining beneficiaries. 
Linda Thomas will receive $500.00 from the house and $500.00 from 
U.S.-Steele, the $500.00 to be paid after the sale of the home. 
Connie Rowan will receive $1,000.00 after the sale of the home. My 
wife will receive the balance of my estate. 
Second, as my personal representative, Linda Thomas will serve 
first as sole personal representative, to be succeeded by 4M£fe> 
4M0BM. If neither of these survive me, or are disqualified for 
any reason, Connie Rowan will be the alternate successor personal 
representative. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name to this 
a Codicil to my Last Will and Testament, consisting of this 
typewritten page and for the purpose of identification I have 
signed this page in the presence of the persons witnessing it a£ mY-
request on this£T7day o f J ^ M i l % - ' 199-£' at J^ZL^'< L- P^i& 
, Utah. 
L M F. JACKSOft 
TESTATOR 
3* (la^fe^m^ 
The foregoing instrument, consisting of this page, was signed 
and declared by LYNN F. JACKSON, the Testator, to be a Codicil to 
his Last Will and Testament, in our presence, and we, at his 
request and in the presence of each other have hereunto subscribed 
our names as witnesses, thisoZ ydav of yjJ/TSLi 
199j^  at ^p/k^J^ L_ ^ JJW^ 
mu/1> 
Utah. 
WITNESS NESS 
APPENDIX C 
TRANSCRIPT OF COURT'S ORAL RULING 
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1 I it just — at the end of the first sentence, the word, 
2 "following," and I think this is what is significant. 
3 "Following the deposition of the deed, Lillian Chaney's 
4 (inaudible) advice plaintiff (inaudible) the safety deposit box 
5 and instructed plaintiff that upon her death he should go to 
6 j.the bank where he would be granted access to the safety deposit 
7 box and its contents. 
8 Then if you skip a number of sentences and go to the 
9 last one of that paragraph it says, "At all times prior to her 
10 death Lillian Chaney was in possession of the key to the safety 
11 I deposit box and had sole and complete control of it. Plaintiff 
12 was never given a key to the safety deposit box." 
13 These facts are distinguishable from the facts of this 
14 case because in this case there were no specific instructions 
15 that only upon the event of death would they have access to the 
16 box— 
17 THE COURT: The language here clearly is that there 
18 was no immediate or present intent— 
19 MR. WEIGHT: Right. And further, Linda Thomas always 
20 had a key from within a couple of months of his opening the 
21 I box. We still take the position that's a present intent that 
22 | he conveyed it away and therefore what he had conveyed away he 
23 I could not effect by a will, what he did own he could. Thank 
24 I you. 
25 | THE COURT: The tough thing about these cases 
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sometimes is that it appears that Mr. Jackson changed his mind, 
and had he lived another month or two he may have changed his 
mind one or two more times. Sometimes it seems like the wheel 
on jeopardy, as it goes around you end up with what you end up 
with (inaudible). 
MR. BLACK: Wheel of Fortune. 
THE COURT: The Wheel of Fortune, and maybe that's not 
a good reference of this case. The evidence that I have heard 
with regard to the delivery is that it appears that Mr. Jackson 
wanted to console his family because of an impending marriage, 
that his family expressed some concern that the interests of 
his wife to be were not all together pure, and that he wanted 
to preserve his home for his family. 
So he made the appointment with Mr. Coxson, went to 
Mr. Coxson's office with his two daughters and went through the 
motions of preparing a deed to the daughters. He was 
specifically advised of the difference between deeds of rights 
of succession and a deed of tenancy in common that would be a 
joint tenant as opposed to a tenant in common. He understood. 
The only evidence I have is that he understood, that the deed, 
Exhibit 1, as prepared divided the property into one-third 
interests equally, and it was his specific instruction that it 
be prepared that way. 
He went to the trouble of going with his daughters and 
having it notarized, having it delivered, and delivering a copy 
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1 of the deed at that point to them, and then instead of 
2 recording the deed took it to the safety deposit box where he 
3 kept his important papers. 
4 The codicil which was written does not, in my view, 
5 specifically contradict the division of the property at the 
6 time that the deed was written, because although he talks about 
7 delivering money after the sale of the home, he was also clear 
8 at the time that he was with Mr. Coxson that he was 
9 instructing — and that he still owned a third of the home, and 
10 he did that on purpose because he wanted to maintain an 
11 ownership interest in the home, he was specifically avoiding a 
12 situation where he would be living in a home that did not 
13 belong to him at all. He wanted to maintain an ownership 
14 interest in the home, and he did that — accomplished that by 
15 the deed. 
16 As to the burden of proof, the burden of proof is on 
17 Mr. Weight, but because this is not a recorded deed I am going 
18 to conclude as a matter of law — and I may be wrong on this, 
19 maybe some court will tell me and then we'll have some law on 
20 it, but my conclusion is that because it is not a recorded 
21 deed, the burden of proof is a preponderance. I find by 
22 preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jackson intended to 
23 transfer his property into one-third interests, and that he 
24 did — and by executing the deed in the presence of his 
25 daughters, the grantees, and causing copies to be delivered to 
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1 them together with giving them access to the safety deposit box 
2 where he specifically showed them the deed would be kept, that 
3 he accomplished delivery. So I find that the home has been 
4 severed into one-third interests, and the estate actually 
5 effectively only contains one-third. That is my ruling. 
6 * Mr. Weight, can you prepare an appropriate order and 
7 appropriate findings? 
8 MR. WEIGHT: I'll do that. 
9 THE COURT: Is there anything else that I need to 
10 determine at this time? Thank you. 
11 (Trial concluded) 
APPENDIX D 
ONCLUSR ^ ,,\vV 
AND ORDER 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. State of Utah 
^'4^QL(' Deputy 
1 GARY H. WEIGHT (#3415) ^ i<^ v uepuiy 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
2 H Attorneys for Linda Thomas 
43 East 200 North, P.O. Box ML" 
3 || Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 373-4912 
4 
5 
6 
10 
IN 11 Hi FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
7 I In the Matter of the Estate of: : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
rrc T AW V*JD JUDGMENT 
8 | LYNN FRANKLIN AVERETT JACKSON, 
jbdteN> 993400423 
91| Deceased. : Division. ': 
: Judge" James k
 Aa>ior 
11 This matter came before the Court foi I null 11n niI,I', Personal 
12 Representative o I I Kit: I state of Lynn Franklin Avercit J^k^cn appeareu . person and with counsel, Gary 
13 H Weight. Maria Jackson, surviving widow of the Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson appeared 
14 in person and with counsel, Michael K. Black. Counsel for the parties called witnesses and presented 
15 evii .ourt being advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, now 
16 enters the following: 
17 FINDINGS OF FACT 
18 1. 'Jecedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, during his life, owned 
19 property in Utah County, State of Utah described as follows: 
20 I Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north 
from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of Section 7, 
21 I Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet; 
22 || thence South 63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
23 II Together with all water rights appertaining thereto. 
24 Said properly \v(is acquired I'v llic Decedent by VV.uI.nitv Deed K.\K\ uliil by I'.'lmn l,loyt.l 
25 Fullmer and Jennie Fullmer on April 4, 1946. 
1 2. The Court finds that during his life, the Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson mad 
2 an appointment with Richard Coxon, an attorney at law, and met wit Mr. Coxon with hi 
3 daughters Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan. 
4 J 3. The Court finds that Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson was advised by Richari 
5 Coxon of the differences between a joint tenancy deed, a tenancy in common deed an< 
6 | the rights of succession. The Court finds that the Decedent understood the informatioi 
7 I explained to him by Richard Coxon. 
8 | 4. The Court finds that Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson instructed Richard Coxoi 
9 J to prepare a Warranty Deed which would convey his interest in the property set forth ii 
10 the paragraph above to himself and his daughters Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan a* 
11 tenants in common. 
12 5. The Court finds that the Deed was executed by the Decedent knowingly and 
13 understanding^ on August 19, 1997 and was notarized the same day. 
14 6. The Court finds that copies of the Warranty Deed were given to Linda Thomas and 
15 Connie Rowan by Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson and that the original was 
16 placed in the Decedent's safety deposit box. The Court further finds that Decedent gave 
17 his daughters access to the safety deposit box by making a key available to Linda Thomas, 
18 Personal Representative. 
19 7. The Court finds that the Warranty Deed executed by the Decedent on August 19, 1997 
20 was delivered to the gramtees and that the conveyance was completed prior to Decedent's 
21 death. 
22 From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following: 
23 
24 
25 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
ii 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1/ 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
CONCLUSIONS OI< LAW 
Court concludes as a matter of law that the Warranty Deed executed on August 19, 1997 
was delivered to the grantees and that the Decedent conveyed away two-thirds of his interest in the 
following described property to Linda Thomas in 11 h I I i uiii Imli-a 
matter of law that the Decedent retained a one-third interest in the property which is presently an asset 
of his estate. The property is located in Utah County, State of Utah and particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north 
from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of Section 7, 
Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet; 
thence South 63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Together with all water rights appertaining thereto. 
I nun Hit 11 II egoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Estate of Lynn Franklin 
Avetett lack son I imj,i II I,I iml I m \l 11\\ ai< LMI.IMIWM an undivided one-third interest in and to 
the following described property located in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north 
from the Southwest corner of Lot 3 of Section 7, 
Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet; 
thence South 63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Together with all water rights appertaining thereto. 
DATED this _ fAprilrSOOO. ••" "^  ... ^ 
• v^THE^OUR^t 
JAMES R. TAYLOI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGI 
1 I Approved as to Form: 
2 
3 H MICHAEL K. BLACK 
Attorney for Maria Jackson 
4 " 
5 I MAILING CERTIFICATE 
6 fl I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ H day of April, 2000, a copy of th( | foregoing to the following: 
I Michael K. Black 
Attorney at Law 
360 West 900 North 
9J Orem, Utah 84058 . 
10
 n 
1 1 II NOTICE OF INTENT TCTSUBMTT FOR SIGNATURE 
12 TO MICHAEL K. BLACK, ATTORNEY FOR MARIA JACKSON: 
13 You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Linda Thomas will submit the abovt 
14 and foregoing Order to the Honorable James R. Taylor for his signature upon the expiration of five (5] 
15 days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prioi 
16 | to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
17 1 DATED this ^ ^ a y of April, 2000. 
18 1 ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 fi 
24 
25 
